Marchmont Kitchen takes orders from a QR code on each table. You scan, the menu opens, you add rounds, and the tab is settled at the end of the night.
There is no sign-in anywhere in this. Scanning the code is the whole of it, and the code encodes the table you are sitting at.
The table number is printed on a small card next to the code. Yours reads 12. The long table by the window, which has been ordering all evening, reads 31.
One change to this request triggers the vulnerability. The challenge is to use your security intuition to work out what to change. Find the value the server shouldn’t trust, change it, and send it. The response tells you whether you were right.
Hint. Charge this round to another table.
“The table number came from our QR code, so it is a fact about where the customer is sitting.”
Bind the tab to something the customer cannot choose. Issue a signed, short-lived token when the code is scanned and key the tab on that, so a round can only be added to the tab it was issued for. If the number must travel in the clear, sign it. Add a test that posts a round for one table using another table's session and expects a refusal.
Anywhere a frictionless flow replaces identity with a location or a device: table and room numbers, kiosk and terminal ids, store codes, locker numbers, meeting room panels, anything reached by scanning a code. The convenience is that nobody has to sign in, and the consequence is that the only thing naming the account is a value the client sends.
One Request Away is a daily series of challenges. They’re like code review, but for HTTP requests: in each one you’re one request away from triggering a vulnerability, and your goal is to identify what you need to change.