Corrywell is a utilities self-service portal. You have an ordinary customer account under [email protected], and you have just used the forgotten-password form on it, so the token below arrived in your own inbox a minute ago.
The company’s contact page lists its finance manager: [email protected].
One change to this request triggers the vulnerability. The challenge is to use your security intuition to work out what to change. Find the value the server shouldn’t trust, change it, and send it. The response tells you whether you were right.
Hint. Set a password on an account that is not yours.
“A valid reset token means this request may reset the account it names.”
Take the account from the token, never from the request: look the token up, read the user it was issued for, and ignore any address in the body. Store it hashed with an expiry and a single use, and if an email must be accepted, treat a mismatch with the token’s own account as an attack rather than as a correction.
Any flow where a secret and a subject travel separately: password reset, email-change confirmation, invitation acceptance, unsubscribe links, magic sign-in, second-factor enrolment, signed webhooks that name their own tenant. The tell is a lookup by the identifier in the request and a validation of the token beside it, with nothing comparing the two.
One Request Away is a daily series of challenges. They’re like code review, but for HTTP requests: in each one you’re one request away from triggering a vulnerability, and your goal is to identify what you need to change.