Halloway Freight lets carriers connect their systems to its portal. Each carrier forwards the clerk’s IP address in X-Client-IP. Your requests include your real address.
You have valid clerk credentials. The admin console only allows requests from the Halloway office network. A support reply includes this network note: Halloway office egress: 198.51.100.0/24.
One change to this request triggers the vulnerability. The challenge is to use your security intuition to work out what to change. Find the value the server shouldn’t trust, change it, and send it. The response tells you whether you were right.
Hint. Open an admin session from outside the office network.
“The address in the forwarding header is where the request came from.”
At the trusted reverse proxy, remove any inbound forwarding header and write the verified client IP. The application should only trust that value when the direct connection came from the proxy. Enforce the admin allowlist at the network edge and test that spoofed headers are rejected.
Check IP allowlists, location restrictions, rate limits, fraud checks, and audit logs. Look for code that reads X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, or X-Client-IP and treats it as proof of the connection address.
One Request Away is a daily series of challenges. They’re like code review, but for HTTP requests: in each one you’re one request away from triggering a vulnerability, and your goal is to identify what you need to change.