Larkfield Media sends a weekly newsletter. Every footer carries a preferences link that opens without a sign-in and shows the subscriber's name, email, postal address and phone number.
Your own link ends u=8241&h=6f2ab19c. The u is your subscriber number and the h is a hash of it, which you cannot compute for anybody else.
A colleague forwarded you their copy of the newsletter. Their link carries u=9330. The request below is their subscriber number with the hash from your link, and Larkfield's help centre mentions that lists imported from their old campaign tool in 2019 had no hashes on them.
One change to this request triggers the vulnerability. The challenge is to use your security intuition to work out what to change. Find the value the server shouldn’t trust, change it, and send it. The response tells you whether you were right.
Hint. Open the preference centre for a subscriber who is not you.
“A signed link is protected, because the signature is checked whenever it is there.”
Require the signature. An absent one is a failed one, and if a legacy list cannot produce them, migrate it or expire it rather than leaving the check optional for everybody. Better still, do not put personal data behind a bare identifier and a hash at all: send the link to the address it belongs to and bind a short-lived token to it.
Anywhere a check is written as an if rather than a requirement: optional webhook signatures, an HMAC on an unsubscribe or preference link, a nonce that is only compared when present, a CSRF token checked when the field exists, an API that accepts either a signed or an unsigned request for backwards compatibility. Before attacking a signature, send the request without one.
One Request Away is a daily series of challenges. They’re like code review, but for HTTP requests: in each one you’re one request away from triggering a vulnerability, and your goal is to identify what you need to change.