Hollowmead Academy publishes reports to parents through a portal. Parents with more than one child at the school use a switcher at the top of the page to change which one they are looking at.
You have one child at Hollowmead. Their pupil code is 9GH412, and it appears on every letter the school sends.
A trip letter went out last week with the form group's list attached by mistake. It gives the pupil codes for all of them, including 4KM207.
One change to this request triggers the vulnerability. The challenge is to use your security intuition to work out what to change. Find the value the server shouldn’t trust, change it, and send it. The response tells you whether you were right.
Hint. Read another pupil’s report card.
“A value the interface writes for itself is a value the server can trust, because no ordinary user will ever change it.”
Check that the selected pupil is one of the children on the authenticated account, on every request that reads the selector. Better, resolve the child from a server-side session rather than from a cookie the browser holds. Add a test that sets the selector to a pupil on another account and expects a refusal rather than a report.
Anywhere an interface has a switcher: the active child, the current organisation, the selected patient, the workspace you are in, the account you are viewing as. The selector often lives in a cookie or a header rather than in the URL, which means an endpoint with no identifier in its path can still be an object reference. The check is to look at what the response names and ask where that value came from.
One Request Away is a daily series of challenges. They’re like code review, but for HTTP requests: in each one you’re one request away from triggering a vulnerability, and your goal is to identify what you need to change.